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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
PAUL KOYD HURLBURT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
14727 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
.~- ! 
This is an appeal from a conviction on the charve 
of receiving stolen property valued at $100.00 or less. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUR'l' 
The case was heard before Edward Sheya, Judge' 
of the Seventh Judicial District Court, Grand County, 
sitting with a jury. At the close of the State's case, 
defendant moved to dismiss the action based upon 
insufficient evidence. Judge Sheya denied the Motion 
to Dismiss. After completion of the trial the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant moved for a 
new trial; the motion was denied. 
·~.:~w.1.;,•;.~.J P' 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the verdict affirmed 
and the rulings of the trial court upheld. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of 
Facts except to exclude any reference to facts 
alleged in the Affidavit of Cydney Osanna. The 
affidavit was submitted to the trial court in support 
of defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial. 
The Osanna Affidavit contains facts not before the 
trial court, and thus not considered by the jury in 
reaching its verdict. The motion for a new trial 
was denied by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT APPELLANT 
RECEIVED STOLEN PROPERTY KNOWING OR BELIEVING IT 
PROBABLY HAD BEEN STOLEN, AND THUS THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE. 
Appellant bases his appeal solely on the 
failure of the trial court to grant defendant's 
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the 
-2-
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close of the State's case. Appellant argues that the 
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
one element of the offense of receiving stolen 
property; namely, that he knew or believed that the 
property had been stolen. 
In ruling upon appellant's motion to dismiss 
at the end of the State's case, the trial court found 
that there was sufficient evidence presented by the 
State from which the jury could find defendant guilty 
of the offense of receiving stolen property. The 
court correctly noted that if there is sufficient 
evidence to support a verdict of guilty, a motion 
to dismiss at the end of the State's case must be 
denied and any questions of fact resolved by the jury. 
The statute under which appellant was 
convicted is Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 Cl) '(Supp. 1975) 
which provides as follows: 
"A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of 
the property of another knowing that 
it has been stolen, or believing 
that it probably has been stolen, or 
who conceals, sells, withholds, or 
aids in concealing, selling, or with-
holding any such property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, 
with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof." 
-3-
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·. 
The jury in the instant case brought back a verdict 
of guilty based upon a finding that the State 
$Stablished each element of the offense of stolen 
property, as Jury Instruction Number 2 required. 
Appellant argues that the State failed to 
'establish that he received, retained, or disposed 
of.tl&e property of another "knowing that it has 
been- stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
9ttlill!IL.• ~ Instruction Number 2 informed the 
j1ii:y tllRt it must be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that at the time defendant received, retained, 
di: di~ of the property of another he either 
tftew the property had been stolen, or in the alter-
native, believed it probably had been stolen. 
As appellant correctly notes, the phrase 
"believing it probably has been stolen" as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, withheld 
constitutional attack in a recent Utah Supreme Court 
case, State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah 1976). The 
Plum court found that the statute was sufficient to 
inform those who would be law abiding of the conduct 
expected of them. The trial court in the Plum case 
was careful to instruct the jury thateach element of 
the crime of receiving stolen property must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jury Instruction Number 2 in the instant 
case complied with the requirement of Plum v. State, 
supra. The jury thus found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that appellant either knew or believed that 
the property probably had been stolen. The jury 
was not required to make a finding distinguishing 
whether appellant had definitive knowledge that the 
property had been stolen, or whether appellant believed 
the property probably had been stolen. The two 
alternatives in the element of knowledge were 
presented to the jury as a single material allegatioa 
in the offense of receiving stolen property. 
Appellant reviews case law from Utah and 
several other states to distinguish certain factors 
present in receiving stolen property cases, particularly 
those facts which were found pertinent on the questi(Pl 
of knowledge. After identifying common factors 
found in receiving stolen property cases appellant 
attempts to·argue that since those common factors 
were not present in his case, the element of knowledge 
has not been established. 
For example, appellant points out that there 
was a two month period of time between the date the 
tool box was stolen and the date he pawned it, that 
he was not in possession of the stolen tool box 
-5-
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r·· 
tbie two month period, that he used his own 
'f&wnin9 the tool box and finally, that 
llllllllilltlllild a logical, uncontroverted explanation 
of the tool box. 
true that the above factors 
be relevant on the question of 
cular receiving stolen property 
held that any one or more 
present to uphold a 
'-ia tlefeadant either knew or believed 
been stolen. 
explain away the fact 
the sheriff when 
about his possession of the tool 
United States v. May, 430 
that a defendant's contradictory 
give rise to the justifiable inference 
was falsely made, satisfying 
, ::tlie kn6iledge requirement of the federal statute 
~ which the action was brought. 
Further, in People v. Malouf, 135 Cal. App. 
2d 697, 287 P.2d 834 (1955) the court found that 
possession of stolen property, accompanied by 
suspicious circumstances, will justify an inference 
that property was received with knowledge that the 
-6-
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property had been stolen. Certainly appellant's 
vague and contradictory statements as to his 
possession of the tool box created a suspicious 
circumstance that would justify the jury in findj,ag' 
that appellant either knew or believed that the icf61}tJA.'-'. 
box probably had been stolen. 
correctly notes that mere possession-of stol.,J:li: 
goods does not in and 
of knowledge, the May and Malouf cases 
that possession of stolen property aCOellllffl~IJltcl .. 
an evasive or contradictory explanation 
possession may be sufficient to 
had been stolen. 
In Barnes v. United States, 93 S.ct.. 
u.s. 837, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973) the jury wae.tMIUJ!lt 
that: 
". possession of recently sbeleir "° 
property, if not safisfactorily ex- : •. 
plained, is ordinarily a cirowtst.imlle•"Ji;~_\. 
from which you may reasonably draw 
the inference and find, in the ~::id· 
light of the surrounding circumstances. 
shown by the evidence in the case, ~~ 
that the person in possession knew the 
property had been stolen." 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the above 
jury instruction stating that the evidence established 
that the petitioner possessed stolen property. In that 
-7-
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stolen Treasury checks payable to persons 
and the record, reflected 
for his possession consistent 
Justice Powell found that the 
w' . . forth in the jury instruction satisfied 
.. '"!-· 
the instant case reflects 
la.ill ... llllllrlff earl Davis questioned appellant 
the tool box that had been 
name at the Five C's pawn 
woke up one morning 
tools in his livingroom, that he had 
~·his apartment the night before and one 
friends might have left the tools there. No 
. . . 4'tegplanation was given by appellant regarding 
.. ··~~ pessession of the tools. 
At the time the Motion to Dismiss was made at the 
close of the State's case, the trial court had heard 
testimony establishing the fact of the theft of a tool 
box, the fact that appellant had pawned the tool box 
at the Five C's pawn shop, and a vague explanation 
given by appellant to the Sheriff concerning appellant's 
-8-
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possession of the tool box. The Barnes, Malouf and 
May cases certainly support the decision of the trial 
court to deny appellant's motion to dismiss at the 
end of the State's case; the State had established 
possession of stolen property by appellant and a 
vague explanation concerning his possession of the 
tool box. These factors were sufficient to peradt 
a finding of guilty knowledge, thus requiring 
trial court to deny appellant's motion to di11111:tallli~ 
The appellant then presented his case 
of his own testimony. The case went to 
based upon the evidence, including testimony of.all 
the witnesses, a verdict of guilty was returned. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant presents a single point on apeeal ... 
He argues that the court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's 
case. Based upon the above cited argument and 
aut~ority, the trial court had sufficient evidence 
before it to deny the motion to dismiss, continue 
the course of the trial, and submit the case to the 
jury. The jury then weighed all the evidence and 
-9-
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·<""" _ lant guilty of the offense of receiving 
'" .. '" 
knowing or believing it probably 
Therefore, respondent requests 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNOH B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
.Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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